Notes on Project 34.1930

P. 1, paras. 1 and 3

Has the deficit that developed in 1955 continued to the present? If so make this clear.

P. 1, para. 2

Can a later comparison with the U. S. than 1955 be made? Say 1958 for both countries?

Pp. 14-26

In Part III much material has been presented, but the presentation is repetitive and somewhat lacking in logical organization. Thus, A. 1 General Development, is both general and specific, historical and analytic.

III.A.2, Post World War II Development, fails to maintain continuity with the preceding section and overlaps III.B., Structure of Foundry Producing Facilities. Thus, III.A.2 shifts the discussion from prewar structure to postwar growth (or lack of same). Without accounting for the failure to complete the postwar plans for growth, the section moves into a discussion of the ministerially structured foundry systems which steals the thunder from III.B.

After reading about all of these difficulties, the reader finds in III.C. that the USSR is the world's second largest producer of ferrous castings, will have to increase its output only by about 10% per year more than it did in 1956-58 in order to meet its 7YP, and is producing more steel castings than the U. S.

This is excellent material, but it needs to be sorted out and presented in a more logical manner. I suggest the following as a more consistent model, but am open to alternative suggestions:

A. Casting output
B. Development of facilities
C. Present structure
D. Future plans

A. Casting Output. Make graphic out of Table 1 and move the present Table with numbers to an appendix. Expand the table to show Soviet plans and plan fulfillment for available years. Add comparisons with U. S. Add another appendix table showing cast steel as a % of the total finished

Notes, continued

steel output of the two countries for selected years. In text discuss current philosophy in the two countries on use of castings vs. metal working as well as cast steel vs. cast iron.

B. Development of facilities. Use most of III.A.1 and 2, emphasizing lack of specialization. Develop origin of the ministry structured system. Account for failure to carry through with post World War II plans.

C. Present structure. Most of present III.C., including tables 2 and 3 and appropriate discussion, except material on TYP. Use Table III for transition to D.

D. Future plans. Here show planned change in production, structure, and composition of output.

If this is a workable arrangement, III.D. could be converted intact into a new section, IV and the present IV would become V.

Pp. 19-20

Spell out meaning of relative deficit.

P. 26

How do you account for this Soviet prediction for castings in view of their high output of machine tools?

P. 36, l. 8

Word missing? Is it models?

P. 39, l. 2

See suggested change in wording.

P. 39 n

Should be shown in detail by years as table or tabulation.

Pp. 39-40, continued sentence

Note changes

SECRET

Notes, continued

Pp. 41-45

Combine Section IV. D. Mechanization, with the present III. D. Technology of Foundry Processes, into a new section as suggested above:

IV. Foundry Processes

A. Technology
B. Mechanization

Pp. 45-50

Well done. Makes excellent sense. I suggest considering the following additional problems:

1. How has the USSR managed to raise its annual increase in output of castings to so high a level in 1955-58 considering the obsolete character of the equipment? If an average increase of only 10% more than was achieved in 1955-58 would meet the 1960 plan(see p. 24), will it be necessary to revolutionize the industry to achieve these gains?

2. In what sense is foundry capacity a bottleneck, as stated throughout the paper? Does it prevent the USSR from achieving its machine building plans? Does the USSR intend to rely to the same extent in the future as in the past on castings in its machine building? Did the foundries fight a holding action pending the beefing up of the metal working machinery park in the post war years and will the foundries play a relatively lesser role in the future? If so, is this why the completion of plans for the construction of additions to foundry capacity were not fulfilled in the 5th YP? What are U. S. trends in connection with the relative dependence on casting vs. machining? Do these help gage future Soviet intentions?

3. Is the foundry bottleneck absolute or relative? i.e., is there unused capacity in some regions? Would structural reorganization break such a bottleneck?

4. Something more should perhaps be said of Soviet intentions by way of division of labor between machinery which has been developed to a high degree (with world's highest output of machine tools) and casting as complementary production processes.

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